

Different Positions to Moderate Islam: Migration and Religious Transformation within Indonesian Muslim Immigrants in London

Amika Wardana, Ph.D

a.wardana@uny.ac.id

Department of Sociological Education, Faculty of Social Science, Yogyakarta State University, Indonesia

Introduction

The article addresses the impacts of migration on the transformation of religious life as experienced by Indonesian Muslim immigrants in London regarding the virtue of their religious tradition, the moderate Indonesian Islam. The discussion revolves around the concept of the translocation of culture in which a (ethno-religious) tradition brought in by immigrants undergoes changes and modifications; blending and mixing with the tradition of the locals; and contextualised by local and transnational socio-political circumstances (Werbner, 2005). Related to this, I argue that the current local and international politicisation of Islam has a tremendous influence on the ways Indonesian immigrants in London construe their ethno-religious tradition. In the West, particularly Britain, however, moderate Islam, though gaining public popularity as a friendly form of Islam that respects religious pluralism and tolerance, has been widely debated and contested within the larger Muslim immigrant community (see Mamdani, 2002; Modood & Ahmad, 2007). For Indonesian in London, their perceptions of moderate Indonesian Islam, as a virtue of their ethno-religious tradition, have been differently re-constructed through the interplay of societal processes of their assimilation into either the minority Muslim immigrant community or the secularised British society of London.

The Contestation of Moderate Islam in the Global Context

Moderate Islam denotes a politico-religious tradition embraced by Muslims who disagree with the Islamist ideology of Muslim fundamentalism, extremism or terrorism. Though highly contested, the tradition of moderate Islam has gained an important recognition in the context of the current escalation of tension between Islam and the West, which is infamously termed a 'clash of civilisations' (Huntington, 1993; cf. Lewis, 1993; see also Khan, 2007). It is said that within the Muslim community, on the one hand, there exist the Islamists who represent a non-conformist group standing head-to-head against Western political domination and in opposition to Western secular and liberal ideology (Sayyid, 1997; Halliday, 2003; Roy, 2007; Al-Azmeh, 2009). On the other hand, Muslims who eagerly accept liberal democracy and the principle of human rights, respect people of other faiths and self-critical of Islamic politico-religious views and traditions, are identified as moderate (Khan, 2007; Modood & Ahmad, 2007).

Besides its political nuances, nonetheless, Khan (2007) points out that moderate Islam is deeply rooted in theological underpinnings. In contrast to Islamist ideology, the moderate tradition has been built from different religious methodological interpretations, orientations and primordial

normative preferences, which are defined as peaceful, non-violent and accommodating to different socio-cultural and political contexts. Similarly to fellow Islamists, however, moderate Muslims share politico-religious impulses to implement Islamic tenets in micro and macro social contexts albeit in a substantive form rather than a formal one (i.e. application of *Sharia* law or foundation of an Islamic state); build a virtuous society that treat others with dignity and respect; and embrace the common humanity of all. Moderate Muslim scholars prefer to conduct *Ijtihad* – defined narrowly as a juristic tool relating to critical reasoning, interpreting and articulating Islamic doctrines as relevant to contemporary socio-political contexts – instead of the military *Jihad* promoted by radical and militant Islamists (ibid). The characterisation of moderate Muslims echoes Safi's (2003) thesis on the discourse of 'progressive Muslims' which was linked with the scholarship of Muslim intellectuals engaging critically with classic Islamic literature and traditions in order to reconcile them with contemporary issues of social justice, gender equality and religious pluralism within Muslim and wider society (cf. Kurzman, 1998 on 20th century Liberal Muslim intellectuals and their works; Kersten, 2011 on the critical and cosmopolitan Muslim scholars of Egypt, Indonesia and Europe).

In contrast to the perceived virtue of Moderate Islam, Mahmoud Mamdani (2002) accuses that the growing popularity of the term expressed in mainstream Western media has something to do with the politicisation of Islam imbued with such a hidden agenda to divide Muslims. Moderate Islam is thus linked to the socio-religious media frame of 'good Muslims' – identified with the political acceptance of Western domination – that is contrasted to 'bad Muslims' – who preserve their Islamist politico-religious aspirations and relentlessly fight against the West. In the context of the presence of Muslim immigrants in the West, Modood and Ahmad (2007) critically point out the socio-political and religious accommodative stance of Moderate Islam is deeply imbued with an apologetic position, accepting the powerlessness of Muslim immigrants especially in terms of the socio-political ethic to challenge the liberal and secularised milieu of the receiving society. To some extent, Tariq Ramadan (2010) states that Moderate Islam connotes to Muslim immigrants with a sense of cowardice, westernised, surrendering their tradition and selling-out their politico-religious identity for the sake of integration and assimilation into the secularised Western society.

The Construction of Moderate Indonesian Islam: a Brief Historical Note

In Indonesia, the moderate Islam has been proudly and traditionally embraced by the majority Muslim populace (Eliras, 2004; Laffan, 2006; Hwang, 2009; Pringle, 2010 and many others). According to Azra (2006), one of the leading Indonesian Muslim intellectuals, the moderate Islam is believed to be deeply rooted in Indonesian ethno-religious cultures, which were arguably forged and developed in different forms and directions in contrast to the apparently more orthodox Middle Eastern Islam. The moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam is celebrated by the socio-historical religious pluralism and tolerance in the country since the pre-Islamic era. The success of the initially experimental adoption of a democratic political system along with the growing Islamic religious piety of the Indonesian Muslim middle classes has consolidated moderate Islam in the contemporary period (Azra & Hudson, 2008; for discussion see Hefner, 2000; Houben, 2003; Effendy, 2003; Mieztner, 2009 just to name a few). Additionally, the

moderate Indonesian Islam has been widely praised by the mainstream media as well as Western leaders including former and current British Prime Ministers, Tony Blair and David Cameron, and especially the US President, Barrack Obama¹. The latter figure has shown a strong appreciation for the tradition given that he spent four years of his childhood in Jakarta². This international recognition is thought to support self-conscious Indonesian Muslims in maintaining religious moderation (Laffan, 2006).

Nevertheless, Laffan (2011) contends that moderate Indonesian Islam have been constructed through the historically contingent narratives of the early Islamisation process and its subsequent developments; and as a product of the Dutch colonial and orientalist policies governing the politico-religious affairs of their Muslim subjects in the Dutch East Indies, which were later adopted by the secular Indonesian government in the post-independence periods. There exist two main historical arguments affecting its construction, (i) the syncretistic and hybrid socio-religious cultures of Southeast Asia especially Indonesia blending Islam with Indic Hindu-Buddhists traditions (see Cœdès, 1968; Lombard, 1996); and (ii) the peaceful conversion to Islam paved through cultural contacts, pioneered by Sufi itinerants and Muslim international traders from India, Middle East and China, insisting a religio-cultural accommodation and syncretic mystical tradition with a lesser concern with nurturing Islamic orthodoxy and orthopraxis (John, 1993; Ricklefs, 2001; 2006; Lapidus, 2002). To some extent, the Dutch colonial and orientalist policies also had a crucial role in the construction of the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam. Islam was first seen as a potential (political) threat to the Dutch colonial rulers. Despite politically repressing Indonesians, the Dutch ruler had adopted a policy to accommodate Islamic (ethno-)religious practices and traditions. The policy was further followed by an attempt to domesticate and drive their Muslim subjects away from the politico-religious influence of the Pan-Islamic movement³ emerged in the Middle East; and promote the pre-Islamic traditions inspired by Hinduism and Buddhism, alongside the locally Islamised ones (ibid; see also Benda, 1958).

The nature of moderate Indonesian Islam was examined in Geertz's classic thesis, *Islam Observed* (1968), which compared the different socio-cultural and political influences of Islam both in Western and Eastern corners of the Muslim world, between Morocco and Indonesia. In accordance with his earlier book, *The Religion of Java*, Geertz (1962) examined the Dutch orientalist innovation of harnessing the dominant legacy of Indian Hinduism and Buddhism during the foundation of Indonesian Islam (see also Cœdès, 1968; Lombard, 1996). It is said that Islam was adapted and adopted, subsumed into and blended with the old Indic Indonesian cultures, beliefs and traditions. Consequently, Islam had not stimulated the major societal (and political) religious changes in Indonesia as was seen in the *Maghrib* of North Africa where Islam had a major impact on civilization, innovation and beliefs (cf. Gellner, 1981). The Islamic culture of

¹ I found the term moderate Islam/Muslim associated with Indonesia throughout various mainstream media accessed via the Internet such as the Guardian, BBC, the New York Times and others.

² The recognition of the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam can be found in a speech delivered by the US President Obama on the Muslim World on 4th June 2009 (for details of the speech, see http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0).

³ In this policy, the role of the Dutch Orientalist Professor, Snouck Hurgronje (d. 1936) as an Advisor on Native and Muslim Affairs to the Dutch colonial government, and his Western and Indonesian disciples were very prominent (see Benda, 1958).

Indonesia has developed within the conscientious socio-religious environment, embodying cultural diversification, syncretisation, compromise, flexibility, reflection and religious multifariousness, which are antithesis to the aggressive, determined, homogenising, uncompromising, religiously rigorous and dogmatic nature of its Moroccan counterparts (Varisco, 2005). It makes sense to characterise the (Malay-)Indonesian Islam as the archetype of the impure, imperfect and heterodox variants of Islam developed in the far-eastern periphery of the Muslim world (Geertz, 1962; 1968)⁴.

Indonesian Muslim Immigrants in London: Arrival and their Polarized Religious Trajectories

The arrival of about 7,000-10,000 Indonesian Muslim immigrants in London⁵ has shown rather different migratory routes and patterns compared to other Muslim immigrants in Britain, who are dominated by labor and economic migrants from the new commonwealth countries, refugees, exiles, asylum-seekers from countries with political connections to the former British Empire, educated professionals and capital investors from oil-rich Arab countries since 1960s-1970s (see Ansari 2004; Hussain, 2008). The arrival of Indonesians can be differentiated according to two immigration waves, before and after the 1990s, on the basis of their different motivations and socio-economic backgrounds. In the first wave, a small number of Indonesian immigrants came to London to work either for British companies, branches of Indonesian companies or were appointed as local staff at London's Indonesian embassy. There were also considerable numbers of Indonesian women intermarried with White British men who previously worked in Jakarta. This first wave of Indonesian immigrants was mostly consisted of educated professionals and/or came from middle-class economic backgrounds.

The next wave of immigration in the 1990s was motivated by different issues. There were a number of Indonesian students who prolonged their stay along with educated-professional and especially legal and illegal immigrant workers. There was also another group of intermarried Indonesians, not only women with White husbands but also husbands from other minority ethnic groups holding British passports such as Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Caribbean or Middle Easterners. The legal or illegal semi- and unskilled labor immigrants are mostly females (domestic) workers⁶, who had previously worked in the Middle East. These Indonesian workers are usually mixed with fellow Southeast Asian (e.g. Filipino) co-workers as many of them have received assistance from *Kalayaan*, a British charity organization assisting migrant domestic workers (see www.kalayaan.org.uk, n.d.).

⁴ Geertz's works on Indonesian Islam, though still very influential, has been widely criticised by numerous scholars (see Hefner, 1997; Laffan, 2003; 2011; Varisco, 2005 and many others).

⁵ This is a rough estimation based on the 2001 Census reporting the presence about 7,000 Indonesian-born people in Britain (ONS, 2003).

⁶ As reported by the BBC Indonesian Service (7 May 2010), the Home Office issued 1,798 visa permits for Indonesian domestic workers in 2009. This number seemed to fluctuate in 2007-8 but then remained stable contributing to 12% of the 16,500 immigrant domestic workers in Britain.

The two waves of migration have impacted on polarizing the religious trajectories of Indonesian Muslim immigrants in London. I identify three different groups within London's Indonesian Muslim community with regard to their different religious integration trajectories, (i) the traditionalists; (ii) the revivalists; and (iii) the secularists. The term 'traditionalist' refers to Muslim immigrants with orientation of pursuing and reproducing ethno-religious traditions brought in from the home country; and to forming or affiliating to their exclusive ethno-religious-national groups in diaspora (Vertovec, 2009; Ameli, 2002). Most traditionalist Indonesians are part of the 1970s-1980s migration wave as they are largely free from the influence of 1990s Islamic reformism inspired by Middle Eastern transnational Islamic movements among the growing number of urban Muslim middle-classes in Indonesia (see Hefner, 2000; Eliraz, 2004). The revivalist group, who are part of the post-1990 arrival wave, shows similar orientation to pursue and reproduce their Islamic tradition yet leaning towards the universally standardized (Sunni) religious orthodoxy, influenced by the 1990s Islamic reformism, and showing readiness to participate into the wider Muslim immigrant associations. In contrast to two groups, the secularists have preferred to adopt the secular culture of British society, as parts of their assimilation path, by individualizing their religiosity, disassociating from any religious association and freeing from any religious authorities (see Cesari, 2004; 2005).

Different Positions to Indonesian Moderate Islam

For Indonesian Muslim immigrants in London, their perceptions of the moderate religious tradition of Indonesian Islam brought in from the home country have been contextualised by the persisting antagonistic relationship between Islam and the West; the current internationalisation and politicisation of Islamic affairs; and importantly by their polarised socio-religious trajectories in the diaspora. To delineate the topic, I draw on Werbner's argument (2005: 745-7) concerning the translocation of culture alongside the integration of Indonesian immigrants into the minority Muslim community and wider British society, in which the 'form and content' of moderate Indonesian ethno-religious traditions have become "open, changing and fluid and yet experiencing a powerful imperative" (cf. Hall, 1990; 1992 remarks on the fluidity of identity as always "in the process of becoming"). The analysis is then elaborated based on three different patterns of Indonesians' religious trajectories: (i) the traditionalists; (ii) the revivalists; and (iii) the secularists. I argue that according to these three different ethno-religious patterns, the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam is differentially defined, asserted and articulated by the three respective groups.

The Traditionalists: asserting the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam

The traditionalist Indonesian Muslim immigrants in London have generally been content to embrace the tradition of moderate Indonesian Islam as their distinct Muslim identity, which is to an extent concomitant with their preference to pursue Indonesian ethno-religious traditions; to group with fellow ethno-nationals instead of other immigrant co-religionists; and their disinterest in adopting the universally standardised (Sunni) Islamic orthodoxy that is currently developing within the diasporic Muslim immigrant community in Britain. That said, the moderate Indonesian

religious tradition is imbued with religious tolerance, pluralism and respect for others with different faiths, which is perceived as distinct from the religiously conservative traditions of fellow Indo-Pakistani, Arab or Somali Muslim immigrants they encounter in the diaspora. The combination of being few in number and having a different physical appearance and culture to the majority Indo-Pakistani Muslim immigrants, has led to the traditionalist Indonesians in London asserting a self-conscious claim to being (ethno-)religiously different and detached from the wider Muslim community in the city.

As discussed in the front, the tradition of moderate Indonesian Islam has been constructed through the historically contingent narrative of Islamisation – defined as a peaceful process brought about via trading networks, Sufi itinerant journeys rather than through any political or military force from foreign Muslim countries – and a *longue durée* assimilation with the pre-Islamic legacies of the Indic Hindu and Buddhist traditions (Geertz, 1962; 1968; Ricklefs, 2001; Lapidus, 2002). Unsurprisingly, the rhetorical stance of the peaceful and acculturated, not to say culturally hybrid and syncretistic moderate Indonesian religious tradition has a strong influence on the way the traditionalist Indonesian immigrants in London define Islam. Royandi, a senior figure in the group has a clear view on this.

As I understand it, all (of the differences associated with Indonesian Islam) derive from the manner in which Islam came to Indonesia and in which Indonesians embrace Islam. Instead of by conquest or war that brings dramatic socio-political changes, Islam was blended into the Indonesian culture. You know *Wayang*⁷, don't you? The coming of Islam did not destroy (Hindu-inspired stories of) *Wayang* but modified them by injecting the monotheistic message of Islam. In my home town, Cirebon (West Java), in the old Sultanate of Cirebon, there was a *Gong*⁸ named '*Shahadatain*'⁹ (to symbolise the Islamisation of the local culture). In other words, Islam adapted to and was adopted into the Indonesian culture rather than alter it altogether. The process has shaped the tradition of Indonesian Islam, which is more tolerant (to other faiths) and open to new influences from different cultures including here in Britain (Royandi, 17 May 2010).

Related to Royandi's view, it must be noted that it is still debated among academics whether Indonesian Islam, defined as inherently peaceful, tolerant and open to adopting other cultural influences, was a result of its different historical development compared to the more rigorous and orthodox Islamic traditions of the Middle East (Eliraz, 2004; Hwang, 2009; Pringle, 2010 and many others). But reiterating Laffan's (2006; 2011) argument, among traditionalist Indonesians in London, there exists a sense of being ethno-religiously different as a result of the marginalised image of Indonesian Islam in the Muslim world, profiled by Western media as an example of the 'Good Muslim' (cf. Mamdani, 2002; on the Good and Bad Muslim according to Western mainstream media).

⁷ *Wayang* is a very popular traditional Indonesian puppet theatre. Though inspired by sacred Hindu stories of Ramayana and Mahabharata, it is believed that *Wayang* was modified and used as the primary cultural medium in the early phase of the spread of Islam particularly in the island of Java.

⁸ A *Gong* is a traditional Indonesian (and Southeast Asian) musical percussion instrument made in the form of a metal disc and hit with a mallet to play.

⁹ *Shahadatain* is the first and primary pillar of Islam that literally means believing in one God and the Prophet Muhammad as His messenger. Testimonies to these beliefs are required in a conversion to Islam.

The tradition of moderate Islam thus stands for a non-conservative or non-political religious trajectory, which is believed to be embedded in the ethno-religious understanding and practices preserved and perpetuated by the majority of Indonesian Muslims. Edi elaborates his personal view of this religious trajectory:

I think being moderate implies a sort of softness or being less fanatical about Islamic doctrines. You know, here in London, we encounter different religious traditions from different Muslim (ethno-national) groups. Pakistanis and Middle Easterners are seen to be more committed to following all of the religious rules. They actively participate in the local Mosque, consume only *halal* food and most of the women wear a *hijab*. Indonesians are not like that. We mostly prioritise other factors like common decency wherever we live. I would say that 'moderate' means conducting rituals and other religious practices in a modified way, not challenging the socio-cultural norms and customs of the locals. So, being 'moderate' means that we adapt to modern lifestyle, by wearing a suit instead of a *salwar kameez* or taking off the *hijab* but retaining the principle of preserving modesty in female dress codes. You know, some Pakistanis here refuse to wear a tie because it symbolises the cross. For me, that is just too much (Edi, 9 March 2010).

The moderate religious tradition denotes a flexibility and openness to modification and adaptation, adjusting to the local socio-cultural contexts (Azra, 2006). In other words, in a statement typical of this group as noted by Edi, the observance of Islamic rituals and other sanctioned practices has to be conducted in accordance with local cultures. In the context of the diaspora, where Muslims are in the minority and the local culture is secularised as it is in Britain, the observance of Islam has to be moderated, modified or changed. Among the traditionalist Indonesians immigrants in London, to some extent, the moderate non-conservative religious trajectory can be illustrated by their relaxed attitude towards total conformity to orthodox Islamic tenets like the separation or limiting of contact between men and women, *halal* dietary rules and the obligation for women to cover *Aurat* for modesty. It has also been shown in their apolitical stance particularly seen in their reluctance to participate in Muslim politico-religious engagements (e.g. public rallies and mass protests), which are intended to challenge the established secularised or Christianised customs and the British political system.

According to this understanding, nonetheless, the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam has a negative connotation implying impiety and disinterest in politics, for which it is criticised by Western-based Muslim scholars like Tariq Ramadan (2010; see also Khan, 2007; Modood & Ahmad, 2007). It is said that the stance taken by moderate Islam is deeply imbued with an apologetic position, accepting the powerlessness of Muslim immigrants especially in terms of the socio-political ethic to challenge the liberal and secularised milieu of the receiving society. In other words, despite having no intentions to surrender their ethno-religious tradition, traditionalists have no interest in actively engaging in the socio-political life of the host society or articulating their distinct socio-religious and political ideas.

Hamim, a leading figure of this group, admits that the tradition of moderate Indonesian Islam has something to do with their heterodox ethno-religious culture and that their claim to represent moderate Islam comes from their religious ignorance and lack of Islamic knowledge.

For Indonesian immigrants at large, considering the tradition in Indonesia, observance of Islamic rituals are best guided by an *Imam* or acting *Imam*. This is because they are lacking in Islamic knowledge, relatively speaking. As you know, I have done my job here leading rituals and religious activities (named *pengajian*) for over thirty years. Before, most Indonesians here did not care about their religion at all ... That is why we call ourselves moderate Muslims, because Indonesian Muslims (particularly women) do not properly cover their *Aurat*. Actually, if we embraced Islam, we would follow its rules completely ... but this is not what Indonesians are about. As you can see here, they go to *pengajian* but not to learn Islam. They go just to chat and socialise. Observance of rituals seems to be marginal (Hamim, 19 January 2010).

A similar view is conveyed by Fadillah, a female Indonesian preacher, whose opinion represents the common values of the religious leaders of the traditionalists. She came up against various obstacles in persuading her fellow countrywomen to wear a *hijab* in all their daily activities rather than just for attending *pengajian*.

For the majority of respondents, however, the moderate Indonesian Islamic tradition in London has a new currency in the context of growing Islamic fundamentalism, radicalism and even extremism and terrorism within the British Muslim community (Laffan, 2006; Modood & Ahmad, 2007; Khan, 2007). Ibrahim, one of the senior figures, insists that owing to their moderate religious tradition, Indonesian immigrants in London are fairly immune to the influence of radical and militant Islamist ideology compared with fellow Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Somalis, particularly the youth, among whom this radical and divisive politico-religious ideology has found its supporters (Gest, 2010). Immunity from the non-conformist religious stance also has something to do with their reluctance to join local mosque congregations and other Muslim immigrant organisations in the city. During my fieldwork, this traditionalists' view was corroborated by their frequently stated indifference towards Islamist ideas and movements such as *Hizb-ut Tahrir*, *Al-Muhajiroun* or *Tablighi Jamaat*.

To some extent, the traditions of moderate Indonesian Islam can be seen as a cosmopolitan stance toward religious pluralism and recognition of the virtues of other faiths and traditions. As noted by Otto, a martial arts master, the pluralist character of the ethno-Indonesian religious tradition can be seen in his learning and teaching of *Silat*¹⁰.

In *Silat* there is a strong Islamic tradition that to reach an expert level or senior *Pendekar*, you must learn and perform Islamic rituals and rules on a daily basis. I largely avoid insisting on this for my disciples. But yes, among my senior disciples, I

¹⁰ *Silat* or *Pencak Silat* is an indigenous martial art that originates in Southeast Asia including southern Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia. The martial art has a strong ethno-Islamic tradition both in its philosophy and practical trainings.

explain the religious aspect of *Silat* in more open ways. In general, I try not to show a strong link between *Silat* and religion, especially Islam. What I always emphasise is the spiritual aspect of *Silat*, which is not only relevant to Muslims but also to other religions like Hinduism. In our school here, we have Indian students who are Hindus. We also have White students who are Christian or who have no religion at all yet believe in the supernatural power of God. Suffice to say, *Silat* is universal, as is Islam, I believe. Everybody can learn *Silat* just as everybody can learn the virtues of Islam. In my opinion, all religions share a similar message of humanity. In our tradition, this is expressed in the language of Islam. Yet in other traditions, it is articulated in different languages. It is common for us here to discuss the singularity of God's message. But because of our narrow-minded (ethno-religious) views, we often fail to recognise it (Otto, 17 May 2010).

The link between the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam and the spiritual movements of the 'New Age' is also expressed by Teguh, a master of the modern Indonesian spiritual movement of *Subud*¹¹, and Arifin, a spiritual healer trained under the Sufi-inspired (west) Javanese tradition. I first met Teguh in the PMI. We agreed to meet again later for an interview in June 2010 at a Quaker house in Wandsworth, South West London after a teaching session of *Latihan Kejiwaan* (spiritual training) with his fellow *Subud* practitioners. According to Teguh, though open to people from different religious backgrounds, *Subud* originates from the moderate and specifically syncretic tradition of Indonesian Islam. In one respect, *Subud* does nothing to violate the primary tenet of Islamic faith; but it does try to spread its peaceful message without forcing or persuading people to embrace Islam. Similarly for Arifin, he provides his spiritual healing therapy to anyone who needs it. Though he claims it is not his intention to convert non-Muslims, he told me with pride that some of his patients converted into Islam after his healing methods cured their illness. He believes that his Sufi-inspired spiritual healing therapy conveys the non-violent and peaceful message of Islam to the people of this country.

The Revivalists: from moderate Islam to the search for an 'authentic' Islam

For the revivalist group, the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam has been regarded both positively and negatively as antithesis to the religiously conservative Middle Eastern and/or South Asian Islam. Moreover, some of them have tended to reject and criticise it while others have attempted to link its ethic of openness to their religious transformation to universally standardised (Sunni) Islamic orthodoxy. Their dual stance correlates with their politico-religious standpoint which was forged by critical appraisal of local, national and international Islamic affairs combined with enthusiasm to join the wider Muslim immigrant associations in Britain. As I argue in other parts of the thesis, they share their (politico-)religious trajectory with second generation British Muslim immigrants and show more eagerness to be involved with their (politico-religious) activities, albeit in a relatively limited way (cf. Lewis, 2007; Kabir, 2010).

¹¹ *Subud* is an Indonesian spiritual movement founded by Muhammad Subuh Sumohadiwidjojo in the beginning of the 20th century. The name is taken from the Javanese word of the Sanskrit derivation, '*Susilo, Budhi and Dharma*', which generally means the making of peace with God Almighty. The movement has spread worldwide including Britain (see <http://www.subud.org.uk>).

For most respondents, the tradition of moderate Islam has been construed as being in their past, their religious stance before and/or in the early years of residing in Britain. Conveying a view typical among the revivalists, Oni, a 'born-again' Indonesian Muslim woman in London, insists that the term describes her former religiosity. Coming from Bali, the only Indonesian Island inhabited by a majority Hindu population with a Muslim minority, Oni points out that the welcoming culture and conciliatory ethno-religious tradition shaped her religious understandings and practices. She illustrates this tradition of moderate Islam by noting that even though her family were devout Muslims, there was no obligation for her to wear a *Jilbab* or *Hijab* and she was allowed to learn and perform traditional Hindu Balinese dances, which are criticised by Muslim clerics as being vulgar and expressing blatant eroticism particularly given the tight and revealing costumes worn. Similarly, Susilo describes how his past religiosity was shaped by the moderate ethno-religious tradition of his hometown in the northern coastal area of Java, being as it was imbued with Sufi-inspired mystical beliefs and superstitious practices. He further confesses to experiencing religious loss when moving to the Indonesian capital of Jakarta. After immigrating to London, his involvement in some Islamic religious circles combined with an impetus to preserve his religious identity in secular British society transformed him from a so-called moderate to a religiously conservative Muslim such that he abandoned his heterodox beliefs and practices.

Aside from seeing the tradition of moderate Indonesian Islam as representing their former religiosity, some revivalists have openly criticised it and ultimately rejected it. Sri, a 'born-again' Indonesian Muslim woman, gave me her personal opinion:

I gave birth to my first son in 1982. At that time, my Islamic understanding did not oblige me to do anything. I did not mind if people around me were drinking (alcohol) or not. I was very (religiously) moderate or even liberal at that time. I saw my (Muslim convert) husband praying five times a day, which was more than enough even though he would often go to the pub with his friends, or leave a bottle of wine on our dining table. I did not object at all ... But, this was clearly my own ignorance, I did not know enough about Islam. My Islamic teacher at *Kampung* had not taught me properly about Islam. He was very moderate. He simply told me to pray everyday, not to consume pork, not to drink alcohol, and that was it. He did not even teach me to wear a *Jilbab* (*hijab*) ... Everything changed about ten years ago. I felt my life had become stagnant because I had realised how ignorant I had been about my religion, may Allah forgive me (Sri, 17 January 2010).

The propensity among the revivalists to reject the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam is expressed by their reluctance to participate in or attend London-based Indonesian Islamic religious circle named *pengajian*. According to Nanik and her husband Shobirin, ever since they experienced a religious transformation during their involvement in the Arab dominated Muslim immigrant religious circle in Portsmouth, they have felt uncomfortable with the mixed gender activities in the *pengajians*. For this couple, gender separation is fundamental to Islam but lamentably ignored by their fellow countrymen and women in London. A similar view is also conveyed by Jasmin, who because of this preferred to join her husband's Bangladeshi communal groups in Tower Hamlets instead of her fellow ethno-national groups.

The Indonesian religious groups and events seem to be too secular for me. Men and Women mix freely without segregation ... In Bangladeshi communities, we are separated. So, women mix with women and men with men only. In wedding ceremonies, we are also separated ... It was very different in Indonesian cultural or religious events and activities. Genders are mixed. My husband dislikes it very much and criticises it a lot. That is why I personally choose not to attend such activities too often (Jasmin, 16 June 2010).

Nanik, Shobirin and Jasmin's views were representative of others in the revivalist group who are generally critical of their home country ethno-religious tradition.

Rejection of the moderate religious tradition is related to its being negatively connoted with a lack of commitment to conform to the Islamic orthodoxy and orthopraxis. Moreover, revivalists equate moderate Islam with liberal or secular Islam, which are characterised by creative or progressive Islamic religious adaptation and adoption to Western liberalism and secularism (Kurzman, 1998; Safi, 2003; Kersten, 2011). To note, given the increased religious conservatism among the revivalist Indonesian Muslim group in London, such open and progressive religiosity is definitely unwelcome. In sum, though having a slightly different rationale, revivalists' rejection of moderate Indonesian Islam seems to relate to its unpopularity and negative connotation among the Muslim immigrant community in Britain with being 'westernised' or 'selling out' one's politico-religious identity (Modood & Ahmad, 2007; Ramadan, 2010).

Similarly to the traditionalist group, however, some revivalist Indonesians in London recognise the positive facets of the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam. A prominent figure in this revivalist group, Usman, insists that the way Islam was embraced by Indonesians through long-term cultural and trading contacts with Arab, Persian and Indian Muslim merchants instead of conquest by foreign Muslim armies, has made Indonesians religiously moderate in terms of adaptability and responsiveness to changing socio-cultural contexts (cf. the previous statement of Royandi, a senior figure of the traditionalist group). The moderate religious tradition is associated particularly with gender equality within the Indonesian Muslim community in contrast to the perceived patriarchal ethno-religious tradition of fellow Indo-Pakistanis or Arab co-religionists. Usman links the moderate tradition with open and mixed gender interaction within Indonesian *pengajians* in London. This opinion is shared by Eliza, an Indonesian woman who intermarried with a White British convert living in Ilford, a neighbourhood dominated by Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.

As you know, Indonesians seem to be more religiously moderate ... [I mean] Indonesian women have a fairly equal role to men. Unlike the Pakistani communities here where the women are somewhat left behind. They are not allowed to join a mosque congregation and they have to be seated separately from men at social or cultural gatherings and events. The fate of Arab women is pretty much the same. They cannot go out of the house without being accompanied by a male acquaintance. In my opinion, this is not how it should be. Men and women should have the same rights in the community. I am glad that I am Indonesian and that my husband learned

Islam in Indonesia. And of course our community here is more open to female involvement (Eliza, 5 May 2010).

This confident appraisal of the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam resonates in the way religious doctrines are taught and learned within *pengajians*, which are unsurprisingly perceived as lenient, flexible and tolerant. This ethno-religious preference is expressed by Nizma in her experience of looking for a religious teacher for her daughters.

At first, my kids joined *pengajians*. I tried to familiarise them with Islam. When they were older, around 9 or 10, I began to search for a private tutor but I could not find any within the Indonesian community, so I had to hire somebody from a different ethno-cultural background. I wanted to show them that Indonesians are not the only Muslims. There were tutors available - mainly Arab or Pakistani. But I was minded to be cautious. Not all religious teachers really understand Islam properly. Eventually, I decided to hire an Algerian mainly because of his English fluency, whereas Pakistanis have quite a different accent. You know, my daughters are mixed-race, half White, half Indonesian. Problems began to emerge because his Islamic culture and the way he taught were very different to my childhood experiences in Indonesia. I would say his methods were too harsh, very stiff and uncompromising. For example, in the teaching, when my kids made a mistake, gave the wrong answer to a question or made errors reciting the *Qur'an*, he would instantly yell and hit the table, 'Not like that!' My kids then cried. For some weeks, it seemed that they felt under a lot of pressure during classes and I also felt threatened ... then I realised that our Islamic culture was different. We learn and practice Islam in a gentle, accommodating and lenient way ... An acquaintance from Morocco told me that 'the best Muslim in the world is Indonesian, because you are so gentle, kind and sincere'. I did not know why she said it, but maybe it was true (Nizma, 14 January 2010).

The moderate religious tradition that Nizma refers to is very similar to Geertz's (1968) cultural dichotomy between the docile, lenient and flexible Indonesian Islam and the aggressive, uncompromising and rigorous Moroccan Islam (see also Varisco, 2005). Suffice to say, the revivalist view of moderate Indonesian Islam shares some similarities with the views of their fellow traditionalist Indonesians in London.

Nevertheless, the view of the revivalist Indonesians in London differs to that of the fellow traditionalists in terms of the radical and militant Islamist ideology and movements (e.g. *Hizb-ut Tahrir* or *Al-Muhajiroun*). Of course the revivalists, like many Muslims, condemn terrorist attacks in the name of Islam and criticise the use of violent and dissenting political manoeuvres perpetuated by the radical and militant Islamist groups that exacerbate tension between Islam and the West. Their politico-religious orientation is articulated by an active yet critical engagement with British society particularly related to local and international Muslim affairs through participation in public protests or mass rallies initiated by British Muslim organisations. Nonetheless, having shared a normative and idealised purpose to build a virtuous Muslim society, they show such a reluctance to completely denounce the uncompromising Islamist ideas and activities. Neng has a view on this as seen below:

For me, they are my friends. I know some of them personally, like people in the *Al-Muhajiroun*, a radical Muslim group here. I even attended one of their meetings. Once, I had an argument with one of them, a female activist of course, as men and women are always separated. I expressed my disagreement with their anti-Western standpoint and questioned why they used speeches to incite hatred towards non-Muslims and why they liked to burn the US or British flags in their campaigns, discussions and public protests. I did not say that they were wrong but I just questioned why they always show such an unfriendly, uncompromising image of Islam in their actions. I asked why they did not try to promote peaceful means, even while criticising any unjust policies of Western states in order to gain respect from the public ... In my opinion, Islam should be presented, particularly in Britain, as a peaceful religion which respects human dignity. It is our duty to introduce this view to non-Muslims here (Neng, 1 February 2010).

It should be noted that relating to their conservative religious trajectory, these revivalist Indonesian immigrants in London have to an extent accepted the idea of Islamic doctrines being an all-encompassing system, in line with the beliefs promoted by militant and radical Islamist groups. This is problematic as it sets them apart from fellow traditionalist Indonesians who unhesitatingly reject radical Islamist ideology altogether. As Neng insists, many revivalists retain a respect for Islamist movements including *Hizb-ut Tahrir* and *Al-Muhajiroun*, in spite of their occasional critique and having no intent to join them. This politico-religious stance is shared by most members of the revivalist group.

The Secularists: the quest for a non-Islamic Indonesian tradition

The secularist Indonesian immigrants in London have undermined their Muslim heritage in the process of integration into British secular society. This tendency is concomitant with their status as partially practising Muslims and/or having followed a secularised socio-religious trajectory after immigrating to Britain. Whether they conceal it consciously or not, their Muslim heritage is to a large extent irrelevant to them as they limit their involvement with or even detach from any ethno-religious Muslim associations and socio-cultural (and political) events. With the prevalence of Islamophobia and the securitisation of Islam, it goes without saying that a Muslim heritage is best concealed in order to integrate into secular British society.

Despite its irrelevance, most secularist Indonesian Muslims have a view of the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam similar to that of fellow traditionalist countrymen. For them, the tradition describes the flexible, relaxed and adaptable characteristics of the ethno-religious traditions of Indonesian Islam. Ridwan's comment below shows that the non-orthodox and non-fanatical connotation of moderate Indonesian Islam justifies a partial adherence to Islamic practices which is contrasted with the religious devotion of fellow revivalist Indonesians and Indo-Pakistani, Arab or Somali Muslim immigrant co-religionists perceived as conservative.

If I had to explain my Muslim-ness, I would say it is moderate in a similar sense to the general acquiescence of most Indonesians. What I mean by moderate is characterised by a social openness to interact with non-Muslims; my whole life is not

defined by and dictated to by Islamic tenets. Put simply, it is quite different to the ways of my Bangladeshi or Pakistani neighbours, particularly the radical and militant Muslims, who lead their life fully guided by *Shariah* (Ridwan, 11 February 2010).

Similarly, Ratna considers her secularised religious propensity as by product of the moderate Islamic teaching she received from her family during her childhood. It must be noted that Ratna had grown up in the 1970s when the ethno-religious tradition in Indonesia had not been transformed yet by the wave of Islamic reformism that came later in the 1990s. Having married a Catholic Briton and immigrated to England, her ethno-religious trajectory has been to adapt to the secularised environment she has lived in since the 1980s.

As I remember, my grandma had never worn a fully covering *Jilbab* (hijab) in her entire life. In my family here and in Jakarta, most of my female relatives have never worn *hijab*. It does not mean they are not devout Muslims – they are devout, even though I am not. What I learnt about being Muslim, as my grandpa said, is to believe in God, try, if you are able, to observe the rituals like praying five times a day, fasting in Ramadan and giving alms. But the most important part of being a Muslim is being good to other people and avoiding doing any harm to them. In terms of dress code, wearing clothes that satisfy public decency is more than enough (Ratna, 10 May 2010).

For the secularists, admiration for the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam has allowed them to subsume or conceal their secular trajectory. In other words, under the umbrella of this tradition, they are able to preserve their Muslim heritage while actively becoming secular in terms of exempting themselves from the observance of Islamic rituals and sanctioned practices. In the context of diaspora, by acquiescing to this moderate tradition, they are free and eager to adopt and assimilate into the secularised culture of British society. Suffice to say, the secularist Indonesian immigrants in London have exerted the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam in the same way Ramadan (2010) criticised it as a negative act of selling out their Muslim politico-religious identity through acculturation to Western secularised values (cf. Khan, 2007; Modood & Ahmad, 2007).

In defending their view, similarly to their fellow traditionalists, moderate Islam is construed as the best tradition to enable Muslim immigrants to integrate into the host society. This opinion is common among members of the secularist Indonesian immigrants in London like Ratna and Ridwan. For them, the assertion of moderate Islam has been shaped by their disillusionment with the current wider developments of radical and militant Islamic ideology, which is blamed for radicalising Muslim immigrants particularly the youth (e.g. referred to as homegrown Muslim terrorists) and stimulating the formation of an exclusive ethno-religious enclave separated from British society (cf. Cante, 2004; Philips, 2006 on the 'parallel life' of minority Muslim immigrants). Accordingly, the Islamist ideology and movement are perceived as a potential threat to Western secular and liberal democracy as explained in Huntington's (1993) thesis of the 'clash of civilisations' and the 'myth of the Islamic threat' (see Esposito, 1999; Halliday, 2003). For Ridwan, whose opinion is typical of others in this group, having voluntarily immigrated to the West and having a Muslim heritage, there is no choice but to become a 'Good Muslim' and to willingly relax

or abandon his ethno-religious traditions and try to adapt and assimilate to the (secularised) culture of the host society. In other words, it does not make sense to be a 'Bad Muslim' who uncompromisingly commits to their faith and religious tradition and to politically challenge the established Western secular cultures of the receiving society (Mamdani, 2002).

To some extent, the disillusionment with Islamist ideology has something to do with the acceptance by the secularist Indonesians in London of the culturally syncretistic tradition of Indonesian Islam, which is perceived to have a different character compared to other Islamic traditions developed in the Middle East and/or South Asia. Related to this, stating a view common to members of this group, Agus questions the role of Islam within the multiple layers of Indonesian culture.

Islam is a 'foreign religion' as it was imported to the Indonesian archipelago just a few centuries ago. It was mixed and adapted to our culture ... but of course there are some parts of Islam that remain not accepted ... For me, you might call me a Muslim, but deep in my heart, I remain a Javanese. It makes a huge difference compared to other (revivalist) Indonesians, Malaysians or Pakistanis here. I embrace Islam in its adapted form, in line with my Javanese heritage, which tolerates and respects other beliefs ... So, all those radical or militant Islamist groups, I definitely cannot accept them. It is said that Islam is a way of life, which dictates that all its rules must be observed. That sort of religious ideology is not for us; it belongs to the Arabs (Agus, 1 June 2010).

Similarly to the general views expressed by fellow traditionalist and revivalist Indonesians in London, Agus' statement resembles Geertz's (1962; 1968) thesis on the adoption and acculturation of Islam into the (Javanese) Indonesian culture thus mixed and blended with the pre-Islamic Hindu and Buddhist traditions (see also Cœdès, 1968). As a result, instead of having become the primary source of social enlightenment, Islam is believed to be only one layer among the many cultural layers of Indonesian society as a whole (Lombard, 1996). Based on the above argument, Agus asserts that the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam espouses a particularly accommodating attitude and openness to various different cultural traditions including (Western) secular and liberal values, which as an immigrant require him to assimilate into British society. Additionally, he rejects the acclaimed totalising and uncompromising system of the Islamic doctrines as promoted by the religiously conservative Muslims or the radical and militant Islamist groups. To note, however, the 'syncretic' and heterodox Javanese ethno-religious tradition has unfortunately experienced a gradual decline in terms of public affinity and membership, having been massively challenged by the growing religious conservatism within the Indonesian Muslim community both in Indonesia and London (cf. Hefner, 2011 on the current decline of the heterodox Javanese Islam in Indonesia).

The disenchantment with the all-encompassing system of Islamic doctrine has encouraged the secularist Indonesian immigrants in London to search for and preserve the non-Islamic Indonesian tradition. These efforts are seen in their communal gatherings where they play *dangdut*, a form of (Malay-)Indonesian popular music. To reiterate, the association between *dangdut* and eroticism both in its lyrics and performances of its (mostly female) singers is perceived as a direct challenge

to Indonesian religious tradition (Weitraub, 2011). Having continued to play the music frowned upon by Islam, the secularist Indonesians in London have attempted not only to disassociate themselves from the increased role of religion among the Indonesian Muslim community in London but also to preserve their non-Islamic Indonesian tradition (cf. Werbner, 2004 on the popularity of the hybrid '*Bhangra*' music among Indo-Pakistani Muslims). In addition, their occasional public performances at Indonesian cultural events, supported by the Indonesian Embassy in London, has to some extent undermined the growing ethno-religious conservatism within the community.

Concluding Remarks

Throughout the article, I discuss the different positions taken by Indonesians in London regarding the moderate tradition of Islam. Their views have been considered in the context of persisting antagonism in relations between Islam and the West, the current internationalisation and politicisation of Islamic affairs and importantly their polarised socio-religious trajectories in the diaspora. Based on three different patterns of Indonesians' religious trajectories – (i) the traditionalists; (ii) the revivalists; and (iii) the secularists – I consider that the approach to the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam has been differently defined, asserted and articulated by these three different groups. For the traditionalists, the moderate tradition has been embraced positively as a compensation for their limited incorporation into the wider minority Muslim community, which in some respects they perceive as religiously too conservative, orthodox and/or radical and militant. For the revivalists, though asserting its virtue, they have shown a critical standpoint to the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam as religiously syncretistic, impure and/or far from the authentic and legitimate form of Islam. For the secularists, they have shared the similar assertiveness of the traditionalists to this moderate religious tradition – understood as essentially flexible, relaxed, adaptable and less rigorous – in order to justify their partial practice of Islam and their individualised religious propensity.

References

- Al-Azmeh, Aziz. 2009. *Islams and Modernities*. London: Verso.
- Ameli, Saied Reza. 2002. *Globalization, Americanization and British Muslim Identity*. London: ICAS.
- Ansari, Humayun. 2004. *The Infidel Within: Muslim in Britain since 1800*. London: Hurst and Company.
- Azra, Azyumardi. 2006. *Indonesia, Islam, And Democracy: Dynamics in a Global Context*. Jakarta: Soltice Publishing.
- Azra, Azyumardi and Wayne Hudson. 2008. "Islam Beyond Conflict: Indonesian Islam and Western Political Theory." Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Benda, Harry. 1958. "Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia." *The Journal of Modern History* 30:338-347.
- Cesari, Jocelyn. 2005. "Islam, Secularism and Multiculturalism After 9/1: A Transatlantic Comparison." Pp. 39-54 in *Europeen Muslims and the Secular State*, edited by J. Cesari and S. n. McLoughlin. Aldershot Hamshire: Ashgate.

- Cesari, Jocelyne. 2004. *When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States*. New York: Plagrave Macmillan.
- Cœdès, George. 1968. *The Indianized States of South-East Asia*. Hawaii: East-West Centre Press.
- Effendy, Bahtiar. 2003. *Islam and the state in Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Eliraz, Giora. 2004. *Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism and the Middle East Dimension*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Book.
- Esposito, John L. 1999. *The Islamic Threat: Myth of Reality?* Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Geertz, Clifford. 1964. *The Religion of Java*. Illinois: Free Press of Glencoe; Collier-Macmillan.
- Geertz, Clifford. 1968. *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia*. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Gellner, Ernest. 1981. *Muslim Society*, Edited by J. Goody. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gest, John. 2010. *Apart: Alienated and Engaged Muslims in the West*. London: Hurst and Co.
- Hall, Stuart. 1990. "Cultural identity and diaspora." Pp. 222-237 in *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*, edited by J. Rutherford. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Hall, Stuart. 1992. "New Ethnicities." Pp. 252-259 in *Race, Culture and Difference*, edited by J. Donald and A. Rattansi. London: Sage.
- Halliday, Fred. 2003. *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Hefner, Robert W. 2000. *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratisation in Indonesia*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Hefner, Robert W. 2011. "Where have the Abangan Gone? Religionization and the decline of non-standard Islam in Contemporary Indonesia." Pp. 71-114 in *The Politics of Religion in Indonesia: Syncretism, Orthodoxy and Religious Contetion in Java and Bali*, edited by M. Picard and R. Madinier. London: Routledge.
- Houben, Vincent J.H. 2003. "Southeast Asia and Islam." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 588:149-170.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. "The Clash of Civilization." *Foreign Affairs* 72:22-49.
- Hussain, Serena. 2008a. *Muslims on the Map: A National Survey of Social Trends in Britain*. London: Tauris Academic Studies.
- Hwang, Julie Chernov. 2009. *Peaceful islamict Mobilization in the Musim World: What Went Right*. New York: palgrave Macmillan.
- Johns, Anthony H. 1993. "Islamization in Southeast Asia: Reflections and Reconsideration with Special Reference to the Role of Sufism." *Southeast Asian Studies* 31:43-61.
- Kabir, Nahid Afrose. 2010. *Young British Muslims: Identity, Culture, Politics and the Media*. Edinbrugh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Kersten, Carool. 2011. *Cosmopolitans and Heretics: New Muslim Intellectuals and the Study of Islam*. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd.
- Khan, M A Muqtedar. 2007. "Debating Moderate Islam: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West." University of Utah Press.
- Kurzman, Charles. 1998. "Introduction: Liberal Islam and its Islamic Context." Pp. 3-28 in *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook*, edited by C. Kurzman. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Laffan, Michael Francis. 2006. "What is Indonesian Islam?" in *UCLA symposium Islam and Southeast Asia*. California: UCLA Center for Southeast Asian Studies.

- Laffan, Michael Francis. 2011. *The Making of Indonesian Islam: Orientalism and the Narration of a Sufi Past*. Oxford, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lapidus, Ira M. 2002. *A History of Islamic Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lewis, Bernard. 1993. *Islam and the West*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lewis, Philip. 2007. *Young, British and Muslim*. London: Continuum.
- Lombard, Denys. 1996. *Nusa Jawa: Silang Budaya (The Island of Java: The Crossroad of Civilisation)*, vol. 1. Jakarta: Gramedia.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. 2002. "Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism." *American Anthropologist* 104:765-75.
- Mietzner, Marcus. 2009. *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation*. Singapore Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Modood, Tariq and Fauzia Ahmad. 2007. "British Muslim Perspectives on Multiculturalism." *Theory, Culture and Society* 24:187-213.
- Pringle, Robert. 2010. *Understanding Islam in Indonesia: politics and diversity*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Ramadan, Tariq 2010. "Good Muslim, bad Muslim." *New Statesman Online*, 12 February 2010.
- Ricklefs, M.C. 2001. *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire Palgrave.
- Ricklefs, M.C. 2006. *Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamization from the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries*. Norwalk: EastBridge.
- Roy, Olivier. 2007. *Secularism Confronts Islam*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Safi, Omid. 2003. "Introduction: The times they are a-changing' - a Muslim quest for justice, gender equality and pluralism." in *Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism*, edited by O. Safi. Oxford: One World.
- Sayyid, Bobby S. 1997. *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism*. London, New York: Zed Books.
- Varisco, Daniel Martin. 2005. *Islam Obscured: the rhetoric of anthropological representation*, Edited by R. W. Hefner. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Vertovec, Steven. 2009. *Transnationalism*, Edited by P. Hamilton. Oxon: Routledge.
- Weitraub, Andrew. 2010. *Dangdut Stories: A Social and Musical History of Indonesia's Most Popular Music*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Werbner, Pnina. 2004. "Theorising Complex Diasporas: Purity and Hybridity in the South Asian Public Sphere in Britain." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30:895-911.
- Werbner, Pnina. 2005. "The translocation of culture: 'community cohesion' and the force of multiculturalism in history." *Sociological Review*.